At not many conferences do the papers presented form by themselves a complete and proportionate portrait of their subject. That of the Canadian Science and Technology Historical Association in 1991 on the 75th anniversary of the National Research Council of Canada was no different. This essay is written both in order to summarize the published historiography of the NRC and to sketch such a portrait for readers who may not be familiar with its literature.
There now are some two dozen books about the National Research Council in whole or in part, and twice as many articles, by a variety of hands from doctoral candidates to mature scholars and from hired propagandists to personal memoirists. It covers the range from narrative to critical history, shading into polemic.
The literature of the NRC is unusual in one respect: the influence on historians of a single document written by non-historians, the Lamontagrie Report, discussed below. Because of either its literary qualities, its adoption by government staff or the absence of any alternative, its hundred-page historical summary has had more influence than any other work on historians writing since 1970 about theNRC.
Narrative History of the National Research Council
The history of the NRC is divisible into convenient periods.
1. From its foundation (1916) up to the NRC Act of 1924. The period may be called a quest for internal leadership and a social niche, as the new organization defined its role in the national and government communities.
2. The growth period, 1924 to 1945 , of the Tory and McNaughton presidencies, including the Depression, 1929 , when the NRC Laboratories were manned, and the Second World War, when they grew to their present order of magnitude. The early history of the NRC (as it came to be called) is documented in The Inner Ring (1966) by Mel Thistle, a staff member for thirty years. This work is not a formal history but a selection of primary documents with a connecting narrative. The book is indispensable to the history of Canadian science and the selection generally excellent: Thistle identified in the records of 1916-35 many primary topics, such as the NRCs relation with government departments and ministers, of recurring importance.
The Inner Ring remains an essential source, however narrowly based on NRC records and staff lore. Its flaws are those of 'insider writing' and by themselves demonstrate the ideology or loyalty of the NRC staff which was for decades one of its practical instruments. Its historiographie defects were largely repaired in Wilfrid Eggleston's National Research in Canada (1978), a narrative history of the NRC's first fifty years. A newspaperman with a lifelong interest in the NRC, Eggleston's research methods sent him to Hansard and other sources Thistle omitted, so that his account of the NRC Bill of 1921, the first disaster in NRC history, shows where Thistle's is anachronistic and unreliable.
As Thistle noticed, one reason for Tory's success in persuading the government to approve the establishment of the NRC Laboratories was the creation of the Ontario Research Foundation, and Ottawa's unwillingness to do less than Queen's Park. Tory's larger ambitions towards national science were frustrated by continuing bad relations with the technical civil service and by the Depression. Only months before the NRC's 'palace of science' was opened in 1932, the government abolished all vacant posts throughout the public service, before the NRC Laboratories were half manned. Peter Oliver, 'Government, Industry and Science in Ontario' in Public and Private Persons (Toronto, 1975 , 1929 , -1951 , (Waterloo, 1984 and Physics at the NRCC, 1929 -1952 (Waterloo, 1979 .
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alities and projects of the time. The history of the Chemistry division, half the Laboratories staff, was never completed as planned.
By the outbreak of the Second World War the NRC was poised to mobilize national science for war research, as had not been possible in 1914-18. C J. Mackenzie became Acting President, chief science adviser to the three armed services and the link with American and British research: the NRC was in Canada the counterpart of the OSRD or the Ministry of Supply. The NRC Laboratories staff grew to nearly 3,000 after the creation of a large radar branch and the administrative absorption of the Anglo-French atomic project. The early war period is documented in Thistle. 8 After the war, the NRC commissioned a general account of those of its activities that could then be made public commercial or product-oriented, and a natural affinity between the two sets. The university was the foundation, as the proper repository of fundamental knowledge and the sole source of supply of trained researchers. Industrial research was a matter for business, since no one else could understand markets so well as people who lived in them. There was, however, a role for government science, in bridging any gaps, i.e. providing those services and performing that research which was truly in the public rather than the private interest, and not provided by the university or industrial sectors. The core of the Glassco Report had then been written and two fundamental conclusions reached. The policy machinery had broken down since the Privy Council Committee ceased to meet in 1949; and the NRC had 'turned aside from its original duty of advising on broad national policy' and concentrated its attention on its own laboratories and university science. The Glassco field staff were unaware of the transfer of the Committee's powers to the Advisory Panel, which they did not investigate: and so did not discover the existence of IRAP until it was announced. Before publication their text was revised to add a reference to IRAP, the opinion of an industrialist that it would do no good. The Glassco Report never mentioned IRAP by name and, having prepared recommendations for co-ordination of national science policy by a Cabinet minister with an independent advisory council, did not temper its conclusions about what had actually happened in the past decade. These two inquiries could and did refer to publications unavailable to the Glassco Commission, particularly those of Thistle, Babbitt, Eggleston and Brown. The Lamontagne Committee's reliance on the Glassco Report and other secondary sources was demonstrated by instructions to witnesses to deal only with events since 1963.
Subtitled A Critical Review: Past and Present,' the first volume of the Lamontagne Report (1970) included a historical narrative of more than 100 pages. Its conclusions were that the NRC had a science policy before 1939 which (for no fault of its own) it was unable to implement; in 1945-63 (citing Glassco) the public duties, especially to industry, and policy mechanisms in the NRC Act were both ignored; and the NRC was principally responsible for the unsatisfactory state of Canadian science in 1970. These conclusions led to a passionate and bitter debate that lasted several years. Like the Lamontagne Report itself this debate mixed past history and future policy alternatives, and the merits of either are beyond the scope of a historiographie essay.
Science Policy and the NRC Today
Independently of their specific criticisms of individuals and institutions in Canadian history, the Glassco and Lamontagne Reports were only one aspect of a general cultural change in the 1960s, which may be characterized as a worldwide professionalization or disciplinarization of functions carried out in earlier generations by precedent (tradition), personal leadership (innovation), consensus and common sense (shared social values, sometimes unwritten). The simplest visible sign of the new era was its attitude to paper. The old system did not require that information be written down or values exhaustively explicit, in order to reach firm decisions. In other words, the opinion of the top man (minister, NRC president, research director, deputy minister, etc.) was usually accepted as effective decision-making. The Glassco Report condemned this tradition in several spheres besides science (e.g. foreign affairs and broadcasting). The new approach for which it was the spearhead claimed to make the process objective by removing the harmful effects of personality and prejudice. Specifically, it required or preferred information on paper, and at times seemed to exclude a priori personal experience, 'informed opinion' or any form of non-disciplinarized claims to knowledge. Historians have however written almost nothing about changes at the NRC since 1970, or elsewhere in government science such as the absorption into a department of the previously independent Defence Research Board. This lends special poignance to the official status of the Lamontagne Report, still used in 1992 by government officials as the essential source on the NRC and the general historical background on Canadian science.
Post
In no other sphere of public policy (e.g. medical, defence, economic) is a twentyyear-old document considered current, let alone essential. The discipline of science policy has shifted its ground in twenty years, from the wing of applied economics (suggesting precise calculation to approach an agreed goal) to that of political science (implying negotiation between people and interests with opposing goals). The process is documented in the work of Bruce Doern, prominent since his 1972 Science and Politics in Canada which enthusiastically applied to Canada the new theories of disciplinarized science policy. An exemplar was the Science Council's Report #4 (1968), predicated on a clear division of responsibility between politicians, whose proper sphere was the promulgation of social and economic goals, and science policy technicians, who could calculate the optimal means to fulfil those goals.
Empirical evidence accumulated in the next decade shows that these theories did not work in the Canadian context, contrary to expectations. Another ten years later he concluded that the administrative union of science policy, trade policy and industrial policy was unlikely to succeed in integrating them logically or politically.
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tably lacking the prior personal acquaintance and common experiences that provided the basis of policy consensus when the whole scientific community was much smaller.
The real dispute about public science and the role of the NRC was less about the 'relevance' and economic and social utility than about criteria by which that utility was to be assessed. Different criteria have been used in four distinct periods of Canadian history. In the period up to the Second World War, this utility was assessed by personal consensus between spokesmen for public science, the chief executives of the NRC and other agencies, and their political masters. There were no strict rules of evidence. Both parties could make their own demands, typically politicians requiring that science conform to the Canadian tradition of regional balance and scientists seeking professional autonomy in such matters as research publications. They were arbitrated by personal discussion. The ultimate sanction, dismissal or resignation on a point of principle, was never reached in the history of the NRC's relations with its politicians. radar, penicillin and the atomic bomb, came out of universities rather than government laboratories.
Economic
The beneficiaries of Steacie's pure research theory were the NRC staff of these divisions and the floating population of PDFs. Both were envied, the NRC staff by colleagues in other divisions and the PDFs at the universities or industries they later joined, where two whole years of full-time research was then simply impossible. The world-wide fame of the Steacie system, and clarity with which its results documented themselves (in research publications, which NRC work on standards, assignments for government departments and industrial contracts rarely produced) meant that it featured prominently in NRC pride and propaganda. Statistics of research staff and spending suggest that one of Steacie's secondary goals, of the NRC modelling the lifelong research career, which Canadian universities and industries would be tempted to emulate, was totally successful. It was ironic that this success would later provide a convenient stick for the NRC's back, when the visible achievements of 15 per cent of the NRC were construed to suggest the whole of the NRC was a 'republic of science,' where private interests were pursued at public expense, disdainful of the industrial work for which Parliament appropriated the money.
When Science Policy claimed the status of a specialized discipline, it offered new and different criteria for decisions. Its ultimate promise was to replace personal impressions about scientific matters with a truly scientific calculus, usually conceived as a giant input-output matrix which could reliably forecast the consequences of alternative choices. This promised to relieve politicians of the burden of acting beyond their sphere of personal experience, and to relieve scientists of the need to lobby uncomprehending politicians to get the money the national interest genuinely required. The prospect of a comprehensive decision-making calculus extended far beyond laboratory research to all spheres of government. Many influential bureaucrats genuinely believed in the 1970s that new techniques would allow them to compare the net benefit to Canadians of $1 million added to one 'envelope,' e.g. pharmaceutical grants or public health education, or taken away from another, e.g. hospital funding or medical research. Enthusiasts of 'systems management' tended to suggest merely proving the advantages of something new would actually cause people to implement it. As early as 1973 the Chairman of the Science Council warned that it was no good the government's promulgating an excellent policy without incentives for humans to carry it out.
For reasons beyond the scope of this essay, the new methods of science policy and public administration did not satisfy either politicians or scientists to the degree their designers had confidently expected. Science policy today appears to have entered a fourth phase, different from both social practice 1917-64 and structural theory 1964-80. Its character is imprecise, except that in hard economic times government science has been 'repoliticized' more than was thought likely twenty years ago. This is not an isolated phenomenon or all bad. The present government has paid more attention than any of its predecessors to the role of provincial governments in science policy, which is These changes together tell historians there has been a transformation of institutional memory, but that memory is still acknowledged as a prerequisite of effective policy. In Canada up to the 1960s, the personal experience of NRC presidents and Council members, university deans, deputy ministers and so on, appeared to be an effective and legitimate basis of institutional memory. As the Glassco Report agreed, many aspects of Canadian science thrived vigorously in the 1950s. But the reformers also pointed out the traditional system did not support the mechanisms of guaranteed efficiency and impartiality promised by new management techniques, and political authority found this convincing.
An independent force for change was the sheer growth of the body of scientific knowledge and the numbers of the Canadian research community. Personal knowledge might be adequate for managing and enlarging a fraternity of a few hundreds in 1945, but could not be expected to cope with a Canadian research community of 18,000 in 1975 or at least 50,000 in 1991. As scholars from Max Weber to Derek Price had observed, the Gemeinschaft was bound to evolve into a Gesellschaft and to change its social relations.
The institutional memory formerly pooled from the minds of a few score individuals is now represented by more than a metre of Science Council reports and studies 1966-90 and the increasingly refined publications of Statistics Canada's science and technology section (some recently discontinued for economy). Immeasurably more, and more concrete, information now exists than was available to the science policy structures of twenty years ago: but those mechanisms have been largely dismantled.
The parent stock of so many Canadian institutions, from the Canadian Standards Association to today's university grants councils, the NRC has declined relatively as its scions grew to maturity. When it was free to act independently, the NRC made no attempt to preserve the monopolies of power that characterized it in the 1940s. By a deliberate act of policy, it sought to plant out science broadly throughout Canada, beyond its own institutional borders.
Choosing itself not to grow, the NRC could not have hoped to maintain its power, because the intellectual and industrial systems of the world have grown at least tenfold since 1945. 'Monopoly is no exaggeration to describe the NRC at that date. In some fields of industrial technology, such as electronics, acoustics, the chemistry of explosives and foods, the NRC staff of 1945 knew more than any industrial team in Canada. In certain academic disciplines, from biometrics and nuclear physics, the NRC enjoyed a similar monopoly of up-to-date knowledge; in all disciplines, what Council members and NRC staff did not carry in thenheads could be easily obtained through their web of personal contacts with all Canadian and many foreign scholars.
Between 1960 Even the environment of bureaucratic power has changed fundamentally in Ottawa since the Glassco Report. The most obvious case is the source of senior managers, deputy ministers and likely future deputy-ministers. For scientific departments such as Mines and Health, these were selected in the bad old days exclusively from men of individual departmental or professional reputation, aged fifty or more, with experience in administration and a demonstrated natural gift for it. The adoption throughout government of new management techniques, administered by the Treasury Board, effectively created a new ruling class, of 44 The privileged autonomy of managerial scientists with professional qualifications was demonstrated by their names: Dominion Archivist, Dominion Astronomer, Dominion Cerealist, Dominion Chemist, Dominion Geologist, Dominion Hydrographer, Dominion Limnologist, Dominion Statistician, and so on. All these titles have now been abolished: less because the word 'dominion' is out of fashion, it appears, than because the supervision of scientists and professionals no longer requires scientific or professional standing, as for the previous century. trained men and women, whose expertise is in those techniques. A crucial difference is that the ambitious individual has to join this career stream before the age of forty. Few scientists of ability are willing to give up research so early. The present system may make it practically impossible for the best government scientists to end their careers in senior management positions.
A political foundation, the NRC has not in recent years been of much interest to politicians. This was not always so. This leaves open the questions of what the NRC is expected to do in 1993, now just one institution among many, and how to maintain in hard times the intellectual youth and vigour it so valued a generation ago. The determining environment of both is the character of 'Ottawa,' and the rules of being a government institution. Fortunately none of these is a question the historian is obliged to answer.
